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This paper revisits the fear of floating hypotheses for eight African countries from
the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s
up until December 2017. This long period of calendar time allows us to extend
previous studies by examining the fear of floating hypotheses in two distinct ways.
First, we look at a set of descriptive statistics to compare the degree of exchange
rate flexibility under alternative de jure exchange rate regimes. We find no
statistical difference between exchange volatility between declared floaters and
fixers, but greater reserve volatility between the floaters, which is suggestive of
fear of floating. Second, we use a non-linear, threshold VAR model, estimated for
each country, to test for a relationship between exchange rate changes and reserve
changes. The results suggest some evidence of a fear of floating for countries
which have declared a de jure floating regime, with the regime-dependent impulse
responses indicating that exchange rate appreciation due to positive reserve shocks
is more prevalent in the high reserve regimes, indicative that level of foreign
reserves available are important for their exchange rate policies. In general,
although the countries with de jure floating regimes have a lower threshold than
those with pegged regimes, reserves adjust by more than the exchange rates
showing a fear of floating.
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1 Introduction
In a perfectly floating exchange rate regime there should be no change in international
reserves held by the central bank, whilst in a fixed exchange rate regime there should be
no change in the exchange rate. In either ‘perfect’ regime there will be no relationship
between the change in the nominal exchange rate and the change in the stock of
international reserves. Therefore when a country declares a floating exchange rate
regime and simultaneously reserves are changing it is suggestive of some intervention
in the foreign exchange market to influence the level of the exchange rate. In this case
we would expect to be able to identify a negative relationship between reserve changes
and exchange rate changes, with reserves being depleted to prevent or at least slow the
depreciation of the exchange rate. This negative relationship between reserve changes
and exchange rate changes was initially dubbed ‘fear of floating’ by Calvo and Reinhart
(2002),1 because developing countries seemed be more tolerant of volatility in inter-
national reserves, domestic interest rates and commodity prices than they were to
exchange rate volatility.
For fear of floating to be a realistic possibility then the level of maintained reserves is
critical if the authorities’ are to be able to effectively intervene in the foreign exchange
market. Throughout the 1990s international reserves as a share of GDP in developing
countries was above that and rose faster than, the same ratio in advanced economies
(Jeanne and Ranciere 2006). By 2005 the gap had closed a little, but on average
developing countries ratio of international reserves to GDP was about 7% higher than
that of advanced countries, most of whom had floating exchange rate regimes. More-
over, the authorities in developing countries intervene in their foreign exchange markets
with large amounts of foreign currency relative to the level of market turnover, the
money base, and the stock of the domestic bonds outstanding.2 Not only is the level of
reserves an unlikely constraint, but according to the IMF (2001) intervention by
developing countries could bring about a greater impact on the path of exchange rate
than in the developed economies because the authorities in these countries do not
sterilize their interventions. This has been confirmed by recent literature. For
example, Montes and Ferreira (2019) not only found intervention in Brazil’s
exchange rate markets was significant, but also indicative of a ‘fear of floating’ in
the country. The ‘fear of floating’ argument, however, contradicts Nogueira and
León-Ledesma (2009) who contend that the apparent exchange rate interventions
are not due to ‘fear of floating’, but are meant to achieve the inflation target
objective of the central bank. In addition, Bleaney and Tian (2014), using regression
analysis verified the exchange rate regimes of several countries and concluded that
their results are consistent with the IMF classification.3
1 See also Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2004) who also argue that the declared, de jure, exchange rate
regime may not be the same as the de facto exchange rate regime.
2 Guimarraes and Karacadag (2004) observe that foreign exchange rate interventions in developing and
emerging countries are very frequent and large in size, while Neely (2007) asserts that authorities in
developing countries still actively involved in foreign exchange interventions across regimes and sizes of
the markets. Killeen et al. (2006) argue that it is the private sector not the public sector that absorbs the
innovation in the foreign exchange order flow when the peg regime is credible.
3 Issue of fear of floating has resurfaced even in developed countries after the financial crisis. The Economist
(2009) runs a special report on that in its June 13th edition where the issue was discussed in context of Western
European countries.
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Another important feature of foreign exchange rate interventions in developing
countries is the position occupied by the central banks in developing countries
(Chandavarkar 1996). Central banks in these countries buy and sell foreign
exchange for a number of reasons, including support for the balance of payments
and with the aim of influencing the exchange rate level or to dampen exchange
rate volatility.4 On the whole, governments or their agencies in the developing
economies are an important source of foreign exchange because of the relative
large size of the government economy. It is also argued that the most important
reason for governments in developing countries often participate in the foreign
exchange market, is defending their exchange rate policy objectives. It was
discovered that on a number of occasions, government of developing countries
or their agencies borrow from abroad with the main purpose of defending their
exchange rate policy and not to finance their fiscal deficits. Taylor (1981) iden-
tified this type of transaction in the foreign exchange market by the developing
countries way back in the early 1980s.
In this paper we attempt to discover whether there is still evidence of a fear
of floating in a number of African economies, some of which declare a de jure
floating rate system, given their increased experience with floating regimes since
the mid-1908s. In other words, we try to test the idea that the fear of floating
identified in the 1990s was simply due to the central banks continuing to follow
traditional policies that they used under the Bretton Woods system, possibly
because they lacked confidence that floating exchange rates would be stable
rates. A lack of evidence of a negative association between reserve changes and
exchange rate changes may confirm a change of behaviour and increased
confidence in international markets. On the other hand, further evidence of a
fear of floating might suggest that our sample economies continue to value a
stable currency over international reserve or commodity price stability.5 One
reason for this may be their concerns with other macroeconomic developments
such as currency crises and more recently, the growing stock of outstanding debt
as 24 African countries now exceed the 55% debt to GDP ratio advised as
prudent by the IMF (Financial Times (FT) 2018; Onyekwena and Ekeruche
2019; Coulibaly et al., 2019). In our sample, only Ghana exceeds this threshold
(with a debt to GDP a of about 70%,) but both Kenya and South African are on
the threshold. The paper uses a threshold VAR model where endogenously
determined threshold is computed and the sample split into low and high
regimes for each country. Consequently, the paper can determine in which of
the regimes that fear of floating exists.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the
data set and Section 3 uses some descriptive statistics to assess the validity of the
fear of floating hypothesis in our sample of countries. Section 4 uses a threshold
VAR model to examine the potential non-linear relationship between reserve
changes and exchange rate changes. Section 5 concludes arguing that there is
some evidence of a continuing fear of floating.
4 These are in addition to their traditional roles as central banks.
5 Refer to Deaton (1999) and Christensen (2016), among others, on importance of commodity prices to
African countries.
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2 The Data Set
The data is taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS) with a monthly
frequency, over the long time period from January 1970 until December 2017, for
eight African countries: Algeria, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
South African and Uganda. The choice of countries was made to offer a large
range of de jure exchange rate regimes, see Table 1, whilst excluding some of the
least developed countries of the continent.
Table 2 presents some of the descriptive statistics on these eight countries over this
40 year time period on nominal exchange rates, foreign reserves, money stocks and
interest rates. All nominal exchange rates exhibit large standard deviations, often over
40% of their means, although with no evidence of skewness or kurtosis. The nominal
exchange rate series are all non-stationary, but their first differences reject the null
hypothesis of non-stationary as shown by the row of ADF statistics.
The money supply and reserve series show similarly large variations over the
sample, but like the exchange rate series there is no evidence of either skewness or
kurtosis and the first difference of the series are stationary, as shown by the ADF
test statistics. The levels of reserves are consistently higher in the second part of
the sample, although the fluctuations are consistently higher in the first part of the
sample, before 1988, the exceptions being Botswana and Ghana whose variations
are much less marked between the two sections of the sample. It seems therefore
that the move towards greater exchange rate flexibility in the last 1980s is
associated with a higher level of nominal reserves, perhaps due to inflation, but
less reserve volatility, perhaps suggesting that interventions are smaller with a
more flexible exchange rate regime.
The interest rates series show the greatest variation of all the series. The
variation is most extreme in Kenya, where the rate of interest ranges from 0.8%
to 84% and exhibits both skewness and extreme kurtosis. For Uganda, a more
typical example, the interest rate ranges from 6% to 55%, but like all other
countries exhibits no skewness or kurtosis. These large variations in interest rates,
although in part a reflection of periods of high inflation is also likely to reflect
monetary policy changes with a view to exchange management.
3 Descriptive Statistical Analysis
To examine the a priori case for fear of floating we initially follow Calvo and Reinhart
(2002) and set out thresholds for nominal exchange rate and reserve changes to indicate
the variation between de jure regimes. In the case of a fixed exchange rate, the monthly
change in the log of the nominal exchange rate, Δet, should be close to zero and
increase with the degree of flexibility. We chose two thresholds, ± 1%, which reflects
the band inside the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, and ± 2.5% range taken from
the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). We
then use these relatively narrow bands to examine the frequency distribution of the
change in the log of the nominal exchange rates where we expect to find that:
Pr Δe < 1%ð Þ < Pr Δe < 2:5%ð Þ < Pr Δe < floatingð Þ ð1Þ
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We construct a similar set of thresholds for reserve changes the results from which are
shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5, which is split into three sections according to the de jure
exchange rate regime.
What is noticeable from Tables 3, 4, and 5 is the similarity between the fixers
and the floaters. In fact statistically there is no difference between the average
exchange rate change per month under floating as under fixing, with t-values of
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Sample Monthly
1970–2017
Algeria Botswana Ghana Kenya Morocco Nigeria South Africa Uganda
Exchange rate (log)
Mean 1.423 0.811 −0.347 1.917 1.109 1.752 0.870 2.873
Std dev 0.621 0.405 1.364 0.430 0.122 0.912 0.382 1.204
Min 0.644 −0.026 −3.542 0.985 0.695 −0.178 −0.023 −1.015
Max 2.155 1.454 1.507 2.572 1.330 2.672 1.429 3.781
Skew −0.153 −0.457 −0.869 −0.721 −1.164 −1.013 −0.851 −1.905
Kurt −1.837 −0.857 −0.052 −0.564 2.077 −0.346 −0.338 2.453
ADF −19.62* −20.48* −6.57* −15.63* −18.95* −18.92* −15.58* −19.90*
Reserves (log)
Mean 3.886 3.654 3.297 3.227 3.694 4.052 4.021 2.784
Std dev 0.903 0.495 0.915 0.710 0.804 0.675 0.865 0.799
Min 2.490 2.289 2.061 1.725 1.660 2.392 2.624 0.207
Max 5.491 4.243 5.187 4.472 4.506 4.917 5.416 3.650
Skew 0.494 −1.376 0.596 0.033 −1.013 −0.379 0.010 −0.701
Kurt −1.160 0.855 −0.978 −1.162 −0.343 −1.346 −1.516 −0.892
ADF −2.95* −19.95 −16.62* −12.90* −16.98* −12.00* −25.78* −15.69*
Money stocks (log)
Mean 4.886 4.271 4.060 5.805 5.669 6.586 5.993 3.675
Std dev 0.891 0.599 0.935 0.849 0.454 0.772 0.730 0.819
Min 3.367 3.087 1.608 4.848 4.800 5.425 5.079 2.523
Max 6.430 5.228 6.076 7.549 6.465 7.935 7.403 5.359
Skew 0.011 −0.132 0.280 0.558 0.065 0.221 0.324 0.579
Kurt −1.211 −1.177 −0.307 −1.131 −1.187 −1.351 −1.349 −0.999
ADF −10.25* −7.01* −19.80* −19.80* −3.80* −5.54* −14.27* −3.70*
Interest rates (%)
Mean 5.586 10.868 19.969 11.922 5.291 13.023 9.924 22.049
Std dev 1.308 2.634 9.685 9.426 1.959 3.723 4.970 10.893
Min 4.000 5.750 10.500 0.830 3.000 6.000 3.750 5.990
Max 8.500 15.500 45.000 84.670 8.500 26.000 21.850 55.000
Skew 0.575 0.114 1.235 3.984 0.552 0.458 0.475 1.317
Kurt −0.388 −1.036 0.620 24.402 −1.241 1.389 −0.994 1.655
ADF −21.82* −20.63* −8.04* −10.31* −19.71* −19.15* −15.50* −16.42*
Key: ADF test statistic is for the null hypothesis of a unit root in the first difference of the series; so the
rejection of the null (denoted by *) shows the time series is stationary in first difference
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0.8156 and 0.002, for each of the bands, even if Algeria is excluded from the
floating rate sample. For example, when Uganda declared a pegged regime the
monthly percentage change in the exchange rate fell between the 1% and 2.5%
bands 51% and 79% of the time. When it declared a floating regime from 1994
onwards, the monthly percentage change in the exchange rate fell between the
same 1% and 2.5% bands 56% and 88% of the time, suggesting less exchange rate
variation under floating. This is a priori evidence of fear of floating.
The difference between the two broad sets of exchange rate arrangements is in the
behaviour of foreign exchange reserves. We would expect reserve changes to be smaller
under floating than under fixed rates and this is confirmed by the data in Tables 3, 4,
and 5. Not only is the average monthly reserve change smaller under the floating and
managed floating regimes, than under fixed regimes (both including and excluding
Algeria), but the sample means are statistically significantly different from zero at 10%
from the narrow band (t values are −1.68 and − 1.89) and at 5% for the 2.5% band (t
values are −3.37 and − 3.65). Thus it is the behaviour of the reserves that indicates the
difference between the two main regimes.
Table 3 By regimes: pegged to USD
Country and Periods Pegged to USD Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
exchange rate falls within:
Probability that the monthly
percent change in foreign
exchange reserves falls within:
± 1% band ± 2.5% band ± 1% band ± 2.5%band
Algeria
1970.01–1980.12 93.13 99.24 17.57 55.73
Botswana
1970.01–1980.12 70.23 91.60 38.93 67.94
Ghana
1970.01–1980.12 65.65 90.08 14.50 35.11
1981.01–1986.08 71.76 93.89 57.25 68.70
Kenya
1970.01–1980.12 85.50 96.95 17.56 41.22
Morocco
1970.01–1980.12 99.89 99.98 99.06 99.18
Nigeria
1970.01–1980.12 62.60 89.31 16.03 30.53
1994.01–1998.12 88.14 98.31 25.42 66.10
South Africa
1970.01–1974.05 84.31 100.00 41.18 19.61
Uganda
1970.01–1980.12 51.15 79.39 7.63 10.79
Ave 77.24 93.88 33.50 49.49
Med 78.04 95.42 21.50 48.48
Std 15.32 6.52 27.61 26.91
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Table 4 Pegged to basket
Country and Periods
Basket pegs
Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
exchange rate falls within:
Probability that the monthly
percent change in foreign
exchange reserves falls within:
± 1% band ± 2.5% band ± 1% band ± 2.5% band
Algeria
1981.01–1994.10 83.73 95.18 20.48 47.59
Botswana
1981.01–2017.12 65.32 94.14 61.26 94.37
Ghana
1986.09–2017.12 68.62 95.74 23.14 53.46
Kenya
1981.01–1993.09 68.63 90.85 30.72 54.90
Morocco
1981.01–2017.12 99.90 100.00 99.52 99.87
Nigeria
1981.01–1986.12 67.61 85.92 7.04 21.13
Uganda
1981.01–1993.10 62.75 92.81 35.95 67.32
Average 73.79 93.52 39.73 62.66
Median 68.62 94.14 30.72 54.90
Std Deviation 13.33 4.39 31.22 27.41
Table 5 Managed floating and floating
Country and Periods of Floating Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
exchange rate falls within:
Probability that the monthly
percent change in foreign
exchange reserves falls within:
± 1% band ± 2.5% band ± 1% band ± 2.5% band
Algeria
1994.11–2017.12 88.49 98.92 51.44 87.77
Kenya
1993.10–2017.12 59.45 89.50 48.45 83.16
Nigeria
1987.01–1993.12 79.52 96.39 32.53 65.06
1999.01–2017.12 81.88 97.81 53.95 94.74
South Africa
1974.06–2017.12 61.80 92.71 55.28 75.43
Uganda
1993.11–2017.12 56.06 87.89 53.98 82.70
Average 71.20 93.87 49.27 81.48
Median 70.66 94.55 52.70 82.93
Std dev 13.70 4.55 8.55 10.26
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Tables 6, 7, and 8 shows that interest rate variability was low under floating or
managed floating regimes – with only Uganda and Kenya showing any signs of large
interest rate changes. Interest rate volatility was highest under basket pegs, largely due
to Kenya and Nigeria whose pegs probably lacked credibility and who both moved to
declared floating rate regimes.
For fear of floating to be credible hypothesis we would expect exchange rate
variability to be relatively low although a floating regime is announced. This low
exchange rate variability may stem from policy actions, in which case the reserve
volatility or interest rate volatility is likely to be high compared to true floaters. In pure
float and pure pegged regimes the correlation between the change in reserves and the
change in the exchange rate should be insignificantly different from zero. On the other
hand, a negative sign denotes some intervention in the market and may indicate a Bfear
of floating^ if the exchange rate is depreciation (rising) whilst reserves are falling.
Similarly a positive correlation between exchange rate changes and interest rate
changes may suggest that central banks are Bleaning-into-the-wind^ to slow the rate
of depreciation or appreciation in a floating rate regime.
Table 6 Interest rate change by regimes: Pegged to USD
Country and Periods Pegged to USD Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
interest rate falls within:
Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
interest rate falls outside:
± 0.25% band ± 0.5%band ± 4% band ± 5% band
Algeria
1970.01–1980.12 96.95 97.71 0.00 0.00
Botswana
1970.01–1980.12 93.13 94.66 0.00 0.00
Ghana
1970.01–1980.12 92.37 93.13 4.41 2.29
1981.01–1986.08 82.35 82.35 8.82 4.41
Kenya
1970.01–1980.12 56.49 71.76 0.00 0.00
Morocco
1970.01–1980.12 99.98 99.98 0.00 0.00
Nigeria
1970.01–1980.12 93.13 93.89 0.76 0.76
1994.01–1998.12 86.44 91.52 0.00 0.00
South Africa
1970.01–1974.05 45.10 60.78 0.00 0.00
Uganda
1970.01–1980.12 90.84 90.84 4.58 3.05
Average 83.68 87.66 1.86 1.05
Median 91.61 92.33 0.00 0.00
Std dev 18.21 12.47 3.06 1.62
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Table 7 Pegged to basket
Country and Periods
Basket pegs
Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
interest rate falls within:
Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
interest rate falls outside:
± 0.25 band ± 0.5%band ± 4% band ± 5% band
Algeria
1981.01–1994.10 99.40 99.40 0.00 0.00
Botswana
1981.01–2017.12 91.44 97.44 0.00 0.00
Ghana
1986.09–2017.12 80.59 87.23 1.86 0.00
Kenya
1981.01–1993.09 16.34 35.95 10.46 9.15
Morocco
1981.01–2017.12 99.95 99.99 0.00 0.00
Nigeria
1981.01–1986.12 93.06 93.06 2.78 1.52
Uganda
1981.01–1993.10 38.56 46.41 7.19 4.58
Average
Median
91.44 93.06 1.86 0.00
Std Deviation 33.19 26.99 4.11 3.51
Table 8 Managed floating and floating
Country and Periods of Floating Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
interest rate falls within:
Probability that the monthly
percent change in the nominal
interest rate falls outside:
± 0.25 band ± 0.5%band ± 4% band ± 5% band
Algeria
1994.11–2017.12 98.92 98.92 0.00 0.00
Kenya
1993.10–2017.12 50.86 65.29 1.03 0.00
Nigeria
1987.01–1993.12 80.72 80.72 0.00 0.00
1999.01–2017.12 94.74 96.49 0.00 0.00
South Africa
1974.06–2017.12 84.13 88.72 0.00 0.00
Uganda
1993.11–2017.12 75.43 84.08 0.69 0.35
Average 80.80 85.70 0.29 0.06
Median 82.43 86.40 0.00 0.00
Std dev 17.08 12.20 0.46 0.14
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The final two columns of Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between
exchange rate changes, and reserve and interest rate changes for all countries in the
sample and across the various exchange rate regimes. BLeaning-into-the-wind^ is
significant in Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Uganda over specific sub periods
and market negatively signed and significant for Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and
Uganda and over certain sub-periods. There are six instances of booth features occur-
ring together (Algeria, January 1980 to October 1994; Kenya, October 1993 to
December 2017; Morocco, January 1970 to December 1980; Nigeria, January 1970
to December 1980 and January 1987 to December 1993; South Africa, June 1974 to
December 2017; and Uganda, January 1981 to October 1993), although only in the
case of Nigeria from January 1987 to December 1993 are both correlation statistically
significant at the 5 % level, but in four of the six instances one of the coefficients are
statistically significant.
Botswana and Kenya (January 1981 to September 1993) have positive and signif-
icant correlations between exchange rate changes and reserve changes, despite declar-
ing a pegged regime, suggesting that reserves were rising to prevent the exchange rate
from appreciating too rapidly.
4 Econometric Threshold Analysis and Results
The descriptive analysis suggests that there may be a ‘fear of floating^ for some of our
sample countries over specific periods of time. Specifically: Algeria (January 1980 to
October 1994); Kenya (October 1993 to December 2017); Morocco (January 1970 to
December 1980); Nigeria (January 1970 to December 1980 and January 1987 to
December 1993); South Africa (June 1974 to December 2017); and Uganda, (January
1981 to October 1993). As identifying a relationship between exchange rate changes
and reserves changes is problematic due to the simultaneity problem and therefore we
choose to use a VAR model, which treats all variables as endogenous to addresses this
issue. Therefore in this section we attempt to test the fear of floating hypothesis using a
bi-variate threshold VAR model, following Tsay (1998) and Balke and Fomby (1997).6
The advantage of this non-linear approach is that not only can the threshold level for
reserves, γ, vary between countries, but so can the delay parameter, d, which indicates
how long it takes the effect of crossing the estimated reserves threshold to be felt by the
rest of the system.
Defining the vector X as X = [Δe,Δr], the bivariate VAR can be written as
Δet
Δrt
 
¼ β11i sð Þ β12i sð Þ
β21i sð Þ β22i sð Þ
 
Δet−i
Δrt−i
 
þ uet
urt
 
ð2Þ
where uet and urt are random error terms, the β(s) ' s are the system parameters to be
estimated with i period lags, where s defines the estimated threshold of the two reserve
6 We attempted estimating a four-variable model that included reserves, exchange rates, money supply and
interest rate, to capture the effect of monetary policy. However, both money supply and interest rate turned out
to be insignificant. This may not be unconnected to the underdeveloped financial systems in the sample
countries, except perhaps South Africa.
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regimes such thatst = {h, l} where h and l refer to the high- and low-reserve regimes,
respectively. The regimes depend on the country’s reserves, such that:
St ¼ h if rt−d > γ
St ¼ l if rt−d ≤γ
(
ð3Þ
where rt denotes the reserves, γ denotes the threshold between high and low reserves
regimes and d denotes the delay parameter.
We follow the conventional procedure in estimating the TVAR model7 in (2). We
first determine the number of lags (p) on the endogenous variables using the Informa-
tion Criteria and test for the existence of multiple regimes using the C(d) threshold test
statistic.8 The testing procedure re-orders the data according to ascending values of the
threshold variable and estimates (2) using sub-samples of the data which partition the
VAR into high and low regimes based on the reserve threshold.
Tables 9 and 10 reports the estimated multivariate threshold, C(d), along with the
delay parameters, d, and the threshold values, γ. The delay parameters are reported
for up to 24 months for each of the countries whose p-values indicate that they are
all significant. The estimated threshold values range from 12.50 for Botswana to
7.16 for Uganda. The results indicate that the threshold for countries with de jure
pegged regimes, Botswana and Morocco are the largest at 12.50 and 10.57, respec-
tively. Since the threshold variable is the reserves this suggests that countries with
pegged exchange rate regimes seem to tolerate higher reserve volatility than those
with more flexible regimes. This is as expected and not evidence of fear of floating,
although what is important to note is that countries with more flexible exchange rate
regimes also have a relatively high reserve thresholds, in excess of 7.00; for
example, South Africa at 7.75 and Nigeria at 8.45, which are indicative of substan-
tial intervention in the foreign exchange market.
The impulse response functions (irf). are computed from these estimated regime-
dependent VARs where generalized impulse responses (Pesaran and Shin 1998) that do
not require orthogonalization of shocks and are also invariant to the ordering of the
variables in the VAR.9 Impulse response functions allow the possibility of investigating
the dynamic response of the variables to different shocks within the system. The
impulse response functions (irfs) derived from the estimated threshold VAR model
show the responses of exchange rate changes and reserve changes to one another in
both high (h) and low (l) reserve regimes over time and are shown in Fig. 1. These irfs
are regime-dependent and therefore we report the responses of the variables to the
shocks in both high (h) and low (l) regimes. The variance decompositions in Tables 11,
7 See for example Çatik and Martin (2012) and Ahmad et al. (2014).
8 The C(d) Test Statistics, asymptotically follow a Chi-square distribution and test for the existence of a
threshold VAR against a linear VAR and also calculates the threshold value, γ, and the delay parameter, d. The
C(d) test is used to re-arrange the variables in the VAR in ascending values of the threshold variable and the
model is then estimated recursively. Tsay (1998) shows that a choosing an appropriate starting value for m0 is
very important, so as not to introduce bias in the empirical distributions of C(d), so we have used different
values of m0 in order to determine the optimum starting value.
9 We have also computed the orthogonalized impulse response functions for robustness check and the results
are largely consistent.
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12, and 13 show the effect of a unit shocks to ue and ur on the variance to exchange rate
and reserve equations.
Table 2 shows both de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes of the countries
covered. The de facto regimes were obtained by using models of Frankel et al. (2001)
and Harvey et al. (2006) as in Ahmad et al. (2011). The table indicates that Algeria,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa have declared that their regimes for most of the
Table 9 Multivariate threshold test
Country Delay Parameter, d C(d) p-values Threshold Value, γ
m0 = 150 m0 = 180 m0 = 250
Algeria d = 1 418.62 460.68 439.12 0.00 9.73
d = 2 421.21 437.21 422.10 0.00
d = 3 422.10 465.66 456.77 0.00
d = 4 435.40 456.97 448.03 0.00
d = 8 439.47 435.32 443.34 0.00
d = 12 600.81 532.75 457.18 0.00
d = 18 546.95 599.17 519.07 0.00
d = 24 669.45 730.15 589.76 0.00
Botswana d = 1 457.41 541.42 509.72 0.00 12.50
d = 2 452.38 520.12 483.57 0.00
d = 3 448.22 529.15 544.82 0.00
d = 4 456.94 515.67 439.84 0.00
d = 8 353.71 434.53 407.71 0.00
d = 12 372.23 468.60 409.34 0.00
d = 18 383.80 538.54 389.33 0.00
d = 24 448.52 508.54 359.49 0.00
Ghana d = 1 556.26 654.06 608.92 0.00 7.35
d = 2 587.16 649.16 554.02 0.00
d = 3 588.93 618.83 630.41 0.00
d = 4 653.50 664.31 591.40 0.00
d = 8 718.72 733.52 578.31 0.00
d = 12 708.38 684.07 531.07 0.00
d = 18 551.57 811.86 594.86 0.00
d = 24 653.20 725.42 298.12 0.00
Kenya d = 1 546.17 357.21 466.86 0.00 7.96
d = 2 511.62 391.12 461.24 0.00
d = 3 504.28 399.09 473.02 0.00
d = 4 502.65 413.38 451.74 0.00
d = 8 460.57 448.53 376.88 0.00
d = 12 420.37 424.90 414.86 0.00
d = 18 350.23 440.87 338.70 0.00
d = 24 341.65 418.18 331.57 0.00
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sample period is floating. Botswana and Morocco are two countries which have had a
pegged regime as their de jure regime for the whole period.
The results for Algeria indicate that the exchange rates have responded insignifi-
cantly to positive changes in reserves in the high reserve regime, but appreciated in the
low regime. The reserves, on the other hand, responded positively in the high reserve
regime, but negatively in the low regime. The results for Uganda also show that,
although the exchange rates have reacted insignificantly to positive reserve shocks, the
Table 10 Multivariate Threshold Test
Country Delay Parameter, d C(d) p-Values Threshold Value, γ
m0 = 150 m0 = 180 m0 = 250
Morocco d = 1 304.01 441.86 338.74 0.00 10.57
d = 2 336.22 456.93 356.88 0.00
d = 3 206.81 484.61 337.82 0.00
d = 4 321.52 481.35 341.98 0.00
d = 8 109.33 499.92 328.63 0.00
d = 12 323.03 508.33 324.22 0.00
d = 18 323.87 446.23 300.13 0.00
d = 24 344.66 506.01 389.98 0.00
Nigeria d = 1 457.41 541.42 509.72 0.00 8.45
d = 2 452.38 520.12 483.57 0.00
d = 3 448.22 529.15 454.82 0.00
d = 4 456.94 515.67 439.84 0.00
d = 8 353.71 434.53 407.71 0.00
d = 12 372.23 468.60 409.34 0.00
d = 18 383.80 538.54 389.33 0.00
d = 24 448.52 508.54 359.49 0.00
South Africa d = 1 444.68 328.05 373.18 0.00 7.75
d = 2 479.47 319.20 382.25 0.00
d = 3 494.07 311.09 467.30 0.00
d = 4 489.83 323.27 396.63 0.00
d = 8 382.20 305.68 366.79 0.00
d = 12 406.80 341.20 429.89 0.00
d = 18 348.64 259.61 415.72 0.00
d = 24 311.36 253.83 340.07 0.00
Uganda d = 1 510.81 422.46 338.75 0.00 7.16
d = 2 492.75 435.63 363.29 0.00
d = 3 467.65 428.41 361.31 0.00
d = 4 456.74 395.04 342.84 0.00
d = 8 588.42 396.97 393.89 0.00
d = 12 227.30 351.52 386.23 0.00
d = 18 424.65 250.95 332.04 0.00
d = 24 463.86 285.10 362.66 0.00
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reserves responded negatively to exchange rate depreciation in both low and high
regimes. For both countries this suggests the existence of fear of floating in the low
regime as the country’s de jure exchange rate was a floating one for the period as
indicated in Table 2.
Fig. 1 The impulse response functions
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The results for Kenya indicate the presence of fear of floating as its exchange rates
responded to positive reserves shocks by appreciating in both low and high regimes. In
the same vein, reserves responded by decreasing in response to exchange rate
Fig. 1 (continued)
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depreciation. Similarly the results for Nigeria indicate that exchange rates have
responded to positive reserve shocks in the low regime by marginally appreciating
Fig. 1 (continued)
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while its reserves to exchange rate depreciation by decreasing in both low and high
regimes. Reduction of reserves in response to exchange rate appreciation in this
context, is an indication of fear of floating as the country’s de jure regime is a floating.
Results for Ghana are generally insignificant responses, except the exchange rates in
the high regime that responded to positive reserve shocks by appreciating for about five
months after a lag of a couple of months. This suggests that the country suffers from
fear of floating only in that regime. South Africa’s results show that neither exchange
rate nor reserves responded to positive shock in reserves and exchange rates,
Fig. 1 (continued)
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respectively, for both the low and high reserve regimes. This is consistent with the
declared de jure flexible exchange rate regime of the country for the sample period.
However, the reserves seem to respond to exchange rates depreciation by a slight
Fig. 1 (continued)
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Fig. 1 (continued)
Table 11 Variance Decomposition
High Regime Low regime
Variance EXC due: Variance of RES due
to:
Variance EXC due: Variance of RES
due to:
Step Std Error EXC Res Std
Error
Exc Res Std Error EXC Res Std Error Exc Res
Variance Decomposition: Algeria
1 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 99.98 0.03 100.00 0.00 0.11 0.61 99.39
2 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 99.93 0.04 99.99 0.01 0.16 0.59 99.41
3 0.03 100.00 0.00 0.06 0.26 99.74 0.05 99.95 0.05 0.19 0.57 99.43
4 0.03 100.00 0.00 0.07 0.60 99.40 0.06 99.90 0.10 0.22 0.55 99.45
12 0.05 99.98 0.02 0.11 7.23 92.77 0.11 99.00 1.00 0.35 0.41 99.59
16 0.05 99.96 0.04 0.13 12.11 87.89 0.14 98.29 1.71 0.39 0.36 99.64
24 0.06 99.91 0.09 0.17 22.49 77.51 0.17 96.58 3.42 0.44 0.28 99.72
Variance Decomposition: Botswana
2 0.01 100.00 0.00 0.02 5.80 94.20 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.02 5.82 94.18
3 0.01 73.09 26.91 0.03 3.03 96.97 0.02 99.76 0.24 0.03 2.89 97.11
4 0.01 56.86 43.14 0.03 2.00 98.00 0.03 99.66 0.34 0.03 1.90 98.10
12 0.01 46.46 53.54 0.04 1.53 98.47 0.03 99.62 0.38 0.04 1.50 98.50
16 0.01 31.38 68.62 0.07 3.69 96.31 0.04 99.63 0.37 0.07 2.60 97.40
24 0.01 30.91 69.09 0.09 5.68 94.32 0.04 99.64 0.36 0.08 3.63 96.37
Variance Decomposition: Ghana
1 0.04 100.00 0.00 0.10 5.15 94.85 0.04 100.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 99.99
2 0.06 99.75 0.25 0.13 3.87 96.13 0.06 99.75 0.25 0.06 0.29 99.71
3 0.07 99.81 0.19 0.16 2.54 97.46 0.07 99.81 0.19 0.06 0.63 99.37
4 0.07 99.85 0.15 0.18 2.08 97.92 0.07 99.85 0.15 0.06 0.71 99.29
12 0.11 99.28 0.72 0.28 3.76 96.24 0.11 99.28 0.72 0.09 2.84 97.16
16 0.12 98.58 1.42 0.31 4.23 95.77 0.12 98.58 1.42 0.10 5.76 94.24
24 0.14 96.76 3.24 0.34 5.05 94.95 0.14 96.76 3.24 0.11 14.19 85.81
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decrease, perhaps reflecting difficulties the currency experience during the latter period
of the sample.
The reported irfs of Botswana show that the exchange rates responded insignifi-
cantly to positive changes in reserves, but the reserves responded negatively to
exchange rates depreciation in both the low and high regimes. This seems to be
consistent with the de jure regime declared by the country as a pegged one. Similarly,
Morocco’s results show that the country’s exchange rates responded to positive reserves
shock by appreciating in both the low and high regimes. Similarly, its reserves decrease
in responding to exchange rate depreciation, both of which are consonant with a
declared fixed exchange rate regime.
Overall there is evidence that the fear of floating does exist among the floaters in the
sample except perhaps for South Africa. This is, of course, consistent with South
African being a more developed economy with deeper financial markets. The results
for countries that report a peg as their de jure regimes seem to suggest that their de facto
regimes are same as the declared ones.
Table 12 Variance Decomposition
High Regime Low Regime
Variance EXC due: Variance of RES due to: Variance EXC due: Variance of RES due to:
Step Std Error EXC Res Std Error Exc Res Std Error EXC Res Std Error Exc Res
Variance Decomposition: Morocco
2 0.13 100.00 0.00 0.19 0.25 99.75 0.13 100.00 0.00 0.19 0.25 99.75
3 0.18 99.99 0.01 0.26 0.14 99.86 0.18 99.99 0.01 0.26 0.14 99.86
4 0.22 99.98 0.02 0.32 0.10 99.90 0.22 99.98 0.02 0.32 0.10 99.90
12 0.26 99.97 0.03 0.36 0.08 99.92 0.26 99.97 0.03 0.36 0.08 99.92
16 0.43 99.72 0.28 0.56 0.09 99.91 0.43 99.72 0.28 0.56 0.09 99.91
24 0.49 99.54 0.46 0.62 0.13 99.87 0.49 99.54 0.46 0.62 0.13 99.87
Variance Decomposition: Kenya
1 0.05 100.00 0.00 0.19 0.17 99.83 0.05 100.00 0.00 0.19 0.17 99.83
2 0.07 99.97 0.03 0.26 0.31 99.69 0.07 99.97 0.03 0.26 0.31 99.69
3 0.08 99.91 0.09 0.31 0.37 99.63 0.08 99.91 0.09 0.31 0.37 99.63
4 0.10 99.82 0.18 0.36 0.39 99.61 0.10 99.82 0.18 0.36 0.39 99.61
12 0.17 98.23 1.77 0.54 0.38 99.62 0.17 98.23 1.77 0.54 0.38 99.62
16 0.19 97.08 2.92 0.58 0.36 99.64 0.19 97.08 2.92 0.58 0.36 99.64
24 0.24 94.52 5.48 0.64 0.31 99.69 0.24 94.52 5.48 0.64 0.31 99.69
Variance Decomposition: Nigeria
2 0.13 100.00 0.00 0.19 0.25 99.75 0.13 100.00 0.00 0.19 0.25 99.75
3 0.18 99.99 0.01 0.26 0.14 99.86 0.18 99.99 0.01 0.26 0.14 99.86
4 0.22 99.98 0.02 0.32 0.10 99.90 0.22 99.98 0.02 0.32 0.10 99.90
12 0.26 99.97 0.03 0.36 0.08 99.92 0.26 99.97 0.03 0.36 0.08 99.92
16 0.43 99.72 0.28 0.56 0.09 99.91 0.43 99.72 0.28 0.56 0.09 99.91
24 0.49 99.54 0.46 0.62 0.13 99.87 0.49 99.54 0.46 0.62 0.13 99.87
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The variance decomposition profiles are reported in Tables 11, 12, and 13. Results for
Algeria show that variations in exchange rates are explained by exchange rates itself but
fluctuations in reserves are contributed by exchange rate volatility where about 24% of
reserve changes are explained by the changes in exchange rates by the 24th month in the
high regime. Changes of exchange rates were marginally contributed by in reserves, about
3% in the low regime. But reserve volatility is generally explained by fluctuations in itself.
Results for Botswana indicate that exchange rate variations are due to changes in
reserves in the high regime where almost 70% of that volatility was due to changes in
reserves. However, changes in reserves were generally due to fluctuations in the reserve
itself. Similarly, variations of the series in the low regime are explained by fluctuations
in the series themselves. Variance decomposition for Ghana show that exchange rate
variations are marginally explained by reserve volatility, about 3% by the end of the
second year in the high regime. Reserve changes played a higher role in exchange rate
variations in the low regime, about 14% of such changes are due to reserve variations.
Morocco’s results indicate that percentage of each of the series contribution to the
variation of each other is very minimal in both regimes.
Kenya’s variance decomposition indicate that reserve fluctuations are responsible for
about 5% exchange rate changes in the high regime by 24th month whereas exchange
rates played a less important role in reserve fluctuations. Results for the low regime are
similar. Both exchange rate and reserve fluctuations played very little role in each
other’s volatility in Nigeria for both low and high regimes. South Africa recorded
contrast results where reserves have contributed hugely, over 60%, to exchange rate
Table 13 Variance Decomposition
High Regime Low regime
Variance EXC due: Variance of RES due
to:
Variance EXC due: Variance of RES due
to:
Step Std Error EXC Res Std Error Exc Res Std Error EXC Res Std Error Exc Res
Variance Decomposition: South Africa
1 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.09 1.03 98.97 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.09 1.03 98.97
2 0.02 99.70 0.30 0.12 1.16 98.84 0.02 99.70 0.30 0.12 1.16 98.84
3 0.03 98.26 1.74 0.15 1.23 98.77 0.03 98.26 1.74 0.15 1.23 98.77
4 0.04 95.81 4.19 0.17 1.29 98.71 0.04 95.81 4.19 0.17 1.29 98.71
12 0.07 65.16 34.84 0.25 1.60 98.40 0.07 65.16 34.84 0.25 1.60 98.40
16 0.09 53.17 46.83 0.28 1.74 98.26 0.09 53.17 46.83 0.28 1.74 98.26
24 0.13 38.28 61.72 0.30 1.99 98.01 0.13 38.28 61.72 0.30 1.99 98.01
Variance Decomposition: Uganda
2 0.05 100.00 0.00 0.10 0.74 99.26 0.05 100.00 0.00 0.10 0.74 99.26
3 0.07 99.99 0.01 0.14 0.42 99.58 0.07 99.99 0.01 0.14 0.42 99.58
4 0.09 99.99 0.01 0.16 0.32 99.68 0.09 99.99 0.01 0.16 0.32 99.68
12 0.10 99.99 0.01 0.18 0.27 99.73 0.10 99.99 0.01 0.18 0.27 99.73
16 0.17 99.99 0.01 0.27 0.30 99.70 0.17 99.99 0.01 0.27 0.30 99.70
24 0.19 99.99 0.01 0.30 0.40 99.60 0.19 99.99 0.01 0.33 0.69 99.31
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variation in the high regime. However, exchange rates’ contribution to reserve changes
has been very little. Results for the low regime is consistent with those of the high
regime. Uganda’s reserve accounted for only about 1% of fluctuations in exchange
rates in both high and low regimes. Similar pattern is recorded for exchange rates’ role
in reserve fluctuations in both regimes.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have re-visited the fear of floating hypothesis for eight African
countries, using both descriptive statistical techniques and more formal non-linear
VAR methods. We find evidence of some continued fear of floating, but since 2000
there seems to have been less volatile movements in the US dollar which has perhaps
been reflected in smaller exchange rates in some of our African countries. For example,
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) report that for the US dollar there was a 59% probability
that the monthly change fells within the plus/minus 2.5% band, but in this sample, it is
nearer a 95% probability. That said we have found evidence of a negative relationship
between exchange rate changes and reserve changes at both the descriptive level and
from the threshold VAR analysis. This suggests that there is some evidence of the fear
of floating, but as countries have become more used to floating exchange rates they
have perhaps also less fear of floating and do not undertake drastic action on either
interest rate policy or reserve policy to protect their exchange rates.
The results also show that most of the fear of floating are found in the high regimes,
an indication that availability of reserve is critical for fear of floating. Therefore, as the
sample countries covered in the study depend on a few commodities for their foreign
exchange earnings, the analysis highlights the importance of diversifying sources of the
foreign reserves. This will reduce the level of foreign interventions in the markets and
promote credibility of the monetary authorities.
Further research could usefully focus on the role of a more internationally stable US
dollar as well as commodity prices on developing countries ‘fear of floating’ type behaviour.
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